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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income and 
high-income countries. The results suggest corruption is anti-labor, since it reduces trade 
in low-income countries and increases trade in high-income countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 Global trade is beset with restrictions. These are more conspicuous in 
underdeveloped countries which have higher trade protection compared to high-income 
countries. A major explanation of these restrictions is that trade policies are designed at 
the behest of special interest groups who benefit from such policies (e.g. Rodrik, 1995). 
Recent literature has also highlighted the role of institutions in determining trade 
openness and distribution of gains from openness. Anderson and Mercouiller (2004) 
ascribed higher corruption and poor enforceability of contracts as important factors 
limiting trade opportunities for developing countries. Given that factor proportions theory 
of trade has clear distributional predictions about the effect of free trade vis-à-vis 
protection, an obvious question in this context is: is effect of corruption on trade 
openness any different between labor-abundant and capital-abundant countries? If 
corruption is indeed anti-labor, then greater corruption would raise trade barriers in low-
income countries and reduce those in high-income countries, thereby adversely affecting 
labor in both situations.  
Marjit (2006) provides a theoretical argument on this asymmetric impact of 
corruption. In his model, corruption is considered as labor-intensive activity diverting 
labor away from productive activities, thereby working against the factor endowment bias 
and restricting trade in labor-abundant countries. Similarly, it reinforces the relative 
factor endowment bias in capital-abundant countries and hence promotes trade. Tavares 
(2003) used Mayer’s (1984) median voter framework to show political rights as a proxy 
for the median voter, and argued greater political rights would provide more political 
power to capital-poor individuals. Given previous evidence on the relationship between 
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corruption and political rights, (Chowdhury, 2004) greater corruption would imply 
shifting of political rights away from capital-poor individuals to capitalists. This would 
reduce openness in labor-abundant countries and increase openness in capital-abundant 
countries. This paper sets out to test these predictions using cross-country data on 
corruption, a trade policy indicator, and real percapita gross domestic product (GDP) as a 
proxy for factor endowment. In the process, it (a) adds to the literature on the effect of 
corruption on trade volumes across countries; and (b) comments on the income 
distributional impact of corruption between labor and capital.   
 
2. Econometric specification 
Since corruption might be endogenous to trade openness, trade-GDP ratio of any 
country was decomposed into exogenous measures of “natural” and “residual” openness. 
This was done by estimating the expected level of openness of a country based on its 
size, geographic, and linguistic characteristics using a gravity-type specification: 
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Wei (2000) refers to the predicted value from this regression as a country’s 
exogenous “natural openness”1. The difference between actual trade-GDP ratio and this 
“natural openness” captures openness determined by policy choices. This trade policy 
                                                 
1 English, French, and Spanish used as language dummies. Geography dummies were a 
landlocked dummy, island country dummy, and coast-land ratio. Remoteness, population, 
French and Spanish language, landlocked and island country dummies generally turned 
out to be negatively correlated with openness. Coast-land ratio while positive mostly 
remained not significant. English language dummy remained positive and significant. 
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indicator was used as the dependent variable in the regressions. The remoteness measure 
is meant to capture the impact of distance on trade. It was constructed as follows: 
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The following specification was used to test the main hypothesis:  
ititittjit GDPpcCorruptionCorruptiony log*** 21 ββγλα ++++=  
      itit zGDPpc εθβ +++ *log*3   (3)  
ity - trade policy indicator for country i in period t; α - common intercept term; jλ  and 
tγ  are region-specific and time-specific effects common to all countries; iβ - parameters 
associated with corruption, real percapita GDP, and their interaction; - other control 
variables in the regression. Countries were divided into eight regional groupings based on 
Easterly (2001). These regional groupings capture effects of regional trading agreements 
between countries. Use of region-specific effects also allows time-constant variables in 
the two-way fixed effects regression. 
z
 
3. Results  
 If corruption is anti-labor (or anti-poor), then in equation (3), the statistical priors 
are 01 <β  and 02 >β . Table 1 reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates based 
on cross-country means for the entire time period (1982-’97) for all variables. 
International Country Risk Guide Ratings (ICRG) data were used as the corruption 
measure. Both corruption and the interaction term are found to have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant for the baseline specification in column (1). Thus 
corruption reduces trade openness in poor countries but increases openness in rich 
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countries. For robustness check, other control variables were introduced in the regression. 
An index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) and colonial origins of countries 
capture important structural features. Dummies for island and landlocked countries, 
population size, and remoteness from other countries indicate geographical 
characteristics. Legal system and religious affiliations represent cultural characteristics. 
All regressions included the region dummies. The results are reported in columns (2)-(5). 
In general, the main results remain quite robust and the asymmetric effect of corruption 
on the trade policy indicator remains significant, except for specification (4). The effect 
of percapita income on trade “policy-induced” openness seems to be sensitive to the 
inclusion of the structural indicators in the presence of corruption and generally turns out 
to be not significant.    
 Given that cross-country averages do not capture time dimension of the 
relationship, equation (3) was re-estimated as a panel. Three different panel data 
estimators were considered: (a) pooled OLS; (b) two-way fixed effects; (c) random 
effects regression with country-specific effects estimated by Generalized Least Squares. 
The results are reported in table 2. The main hypothesis is upheld in every regression. 
Inclusion of control variables does not change the basic results in any substantial way. 
Percapita real GDP appears with a negative sign in all the specifications, which indicates 
that trade for developed countries is mainly determined by “natural” factors rather than 
policy-related issues. Indeed, percapita GDP appears to be positive and highly significant 
in regressions with “natural openness” as dependent variable. The calculated threshold 
level at which higher income reduces openness for different specifications is between 
7.018 and 7.145, close to the sample median percapita income of 7.363. The mean 
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percapita income is found to be 7.467 indicating positive skewness in the income 
distribution.    
 
4. Other robustness checks   
 Other robustness checks were also conducted. Since corruption is highly 
persistent for any country over time, the error terms might be serially correlated. 
Following Wooldridge (2002), this was addressed by using a robust covariance matrix 
adjusting for within-country correlation in the random effects regression. Moreover, since 
corruption is subjective, the ICRG data might suffer from measurement error. This was 
accounted for by using the Business International corruption measure used in Mauro 
(1995) as proxy for the ICRG data in country average OLS regression. Since these data 
come from another source, cover an earlier period (average from 1980-’83), and have 
smaller country coverage (65 compared to around 120 for ICRG), measurement errors of 
the two proxies are probably uncorrelated. The main results remained unchanged in both 
situations2.   
 
5. Conclusion     
 The basic conclusion of this paper is that an increase in corruption reduces trade 
openness in low-income countries (income proxying for capital-labor ratio) and increases 
openness in high-income countries. Given the median voter (generally with relatively low 
capital-labor ratio) will be pro-trade in labor-abundant countries and anti-trade in capital-
abundant countries, we can conclude that lesser corruption in low-income countries 
                                                 
2 These are not reported here for parsimony and are available on request. 
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should open up trade and benefit labor in those countries. A corollary to this is that 
greater corruption should lead to income transfer from labor towards capitalists. It is not 
far-fetched to argue that an increase in corruption would make policymakers lean more 
towards the producers’ groups and enact policies in their favor in the lines of Grossman 
and Helpman (2001). Thus a strong political argument can be made for improving 
institutions in the developing countries since it should benefit the abundant factor in these 
countries.  
 
 
Appendix- Data sources 
Corruption- Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Definition: Indicator of 
corruption in government. Unit: 0-6, higher number denotes greater corruption.   
Real per capita gross domestic product- Source: World Bank (2006). Definition: 
Logarithm of real gross domestic product (GDP) divided by population. Unit: Constant 
US dollars. 
Trade-GDP ratio- Source: World Bank (2006). Definition: (Exports + imports)/GDP. 
Unit: Percent. 
Population- Source: World Bank (2006). Definition: Logarithm of population. Unit: 
Absolute. 
Island- Source: World Factbook 2003. Definition: Island countries indicator. Unit: 
Dummy variable = 1 denoting island. 
Landlocked- Source: Easterly (2001). Definition: Landlocked countries indicator. Unit: 
Dummy variable = 1 denoting landlocked country. 
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Distance- Source: Center D’Etudes Prospectives Et D’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII). Definition: Great circle distance between most populated cities. Unit: 
Kilometers. 
Colony- Source: CEPII. Definition: Colonial origin indicator. Unit: Dummy variables = 
1 for British, French, or other colonial origin. 
Fractionalization- Source: La Porta et al. (1999). Definition: Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization, i.e. probability that any two randomly selected individuals within a 
country belongs to the same religious and ethnic group. Unit: 0-1. 
Legal origin- Source: La Porta et al. (1999). Definition: Dummy for origin of legal 
system. Unit: Dummy variables = 1 for English, Socialist, French, German, or 
Scandinavian legal origin. 
Religious affiliation- Source: La Porta et al. (1999). Definition: Different religions 
making up the population, divided into Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and other 
denominations. Unit: 0-1. 
Region- Source: Easterly (2001). Definition: Regional groupings. Unit: Dummy 
variables = 1 for East Asia & Pacific, East Europe & Central Asia, Middle East & North 
Africa, South Asia, West Europe, North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & 
Caribbean  regions.  
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Table 1: OLS Regression (Average 1982-’97) 
 Dependent variable: Trade policy indicator 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Corruption -0.107*** 
(0.035) 
-0.175*** 
(0.035) 
-0.113*** 
(0.035) 
-0.025 
(0.035) 
-0.104*** 
(0.035) 
Corruption* 
log (Real 
percapita GDP) 
 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.016)*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Real percapita 
GDP 
 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.037** 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
ELF & colony 
dummies 
 
- Yes - - Yes 
Island, 
landlocked 
country, 
log(population), 
remote 
 
- - Yes - Yes 
Legal origin & 
religious 
affiliation 
 
- - - Yes Yes 
Region 
dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 
 
0.15 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.35 
No. of obs. 121 111 121 120 111 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, *, # indicate level of significance at 1% or 
better, 5% or better, 10% or better, 15% level or better respectively (two-tailed test) 
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Table 2: Panel regression (1982-’97) 
 Dependent variable: Trade policy indicator 
 Pooled OLS Region-year 
fixed effects 
Region-year 
fixed effects 
Region-year 
Fixed effects 
Random effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Corruption -0.22*** 
(0.044) 
-0.233*** 
(0.044) 
-0.238*** 
(0.045) 
-0.137*** 
(0.046) 
-0.205*** 
(0.058) 
Corruption* 
log (Real 
percapita GDP) 
 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
Real percapita 
GDP 
 
-0.066*** 
(0.019) 
-0.067*** 
(0.019) 
-0.075*** 
(0.019) 
-0.022 
(0.02) 
-0.119*** 
(0.038) 
ELF & colony 
dummies 
 
- Yes - - Yes 
Island, 
landlocked 
country, 
log(population), 
remote 
 
- - Yes - Yes 
Legal origin & 
religious 
affiliation 
 
- - - Yes Yes 
Region 
dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 
 
0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.25 
No. of obs. 
 
1715 1618 1715 1714 1618 
Threshold level 
of percapita 
real GDP  
7.018 7.031 7.107 7.093 7.145 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, *, # indicate level of significance at 1% or 
better, 5% or better, 10% or better, 15% level or better respectively (two-tailed test) 
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